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Abstract: The histories of “intelligence” and “sexuality” have largely been 
narrated separately. In Lewis Terman’s work on individual differences, they 
intersect. Influenced by G. Stanley Hall, Terman initially described 
atypically accelerated development as problematic. Borrowing from Galton, 
Terman later positioned gifted children as nonaverage but ideal. Attention to 
the gifted effeminate subjects used to exemplify giftedness and gender 
nonconformity in Terman’s work shows the selective instantiation of 
nonaverageness as pathological a propos of effeminacy, and as ideal a 
propos of high intelligence. Throughout, high intelligence is conflated with 
health, masculinity, and heterosexuality. Terman’s research located marital 
sexual problems in women’s bodies, further undoing possibilities for 
evaluating heterosexual men’s practices as different from a normative 
position. Terman’s research modernized Galton’s imperialist vision of a 
society lead by a male cognitive elite. Psychologists continue to traffic in his 
logic that values and inculcates intelligence only in the service of sexual and 
gender conformity. 
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An edited volume on the history of psychology’s power almost requires an 
essay on Lewis Terman (1877–1956), the individual who did more than any 
other to endow all Americans with a measurable IQ that located their 
“intelligence” somewhere under a bell curve. Terman’s (1916) Stanford-
Binet was the most successful of several English language tests of IQ, and he 
contributed to the development of IQ as a “group test” during World War I 
(Carson, 1993; Hornstein, 1988; Kevles, 1968; Samelson, 1979). In the 
1920s, in the wake of the boost to IQ from the army tests (see Yerkes, 1921), 
Terman began an unprece- dented empirical study of intellectual gifted 
children (Terman, 1925; Terman, Burks, & Jensen, 1930; Terman & Oden, 
1947, 1959) - a study that continues to be mined by psychologists today 
(e.g., Holohan & Suzuki, 2004; Lippa, Martin, & Friedman, 2000; 
McColough, Tsang, & Brion, 2003). In the 1930s, when many psychologists 
moved away from eugenics and the hereditarian position within IQ debates, 
that position became increasingly synonymous with Terman’s name and the 
Stanford department that he chaired (Minton, 1988; Richards, 1997). 
 
Given this legacy, it is not entirely surprising that the continuing 
determinative importance of Terman’s work on the psychological meanings 
of “gender” and “sexuality” has taken second place to the politics of race in 
historical accounts of the forms of psychological power that he developed. 
Terman and Miles’ (1936) Masculinity–Femininity (MF) test standardized 
the development of measures of gender, set the paradigm that “masculinity” 
and “femininity” were logical opposites of each other for subsequent 
psychometric tests, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI; see Buchanan, 1994), and was identified as the original attempt to 
measure gender by second-wave feminist psychologists who overturned 
that assumption (e.g., Constantinople, 1973). Terman’s marital happiness 
research (Terman et al., 1938, 1951) has also been taken as foundational to 
later research relating personality differences to relationship satisfaction 
(Gottman & Notarius, 2002), and his statistically oriented but motivated 
critique of the first “Kinsey report” (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948, see 
Terman, 1948) led one biographer to describe him as Kinsey’s “most 
determined critic” (Jones, 1997, p. 588). 
 
Thus, through Terman’s work, “intelligence,” “gender,” and “sexuality” all 
became discernable psychological properties of modern individuals in 
original and unprecedented ways. This article is motivated by unease with the 
ways that intelligence has taken precedence over gender and sexuality in 
Terman scholarship, as when his study of MF is described as appealing to 
him because he “needed a new field for pioneering” (Seagoe, 1975, p. 142) 
or became, in time “a new direction for Terman’s research on individual 
differences” (Minton, 1988, p. 167). Given the often-blatant racism of 
Terman’s thinking, and the ways that racialized debates about IQ have 
recurred throughout the 20th century (e.g., Block & Dworkin, 1976; Jaccoby 
& Glauberman, 1995; Kincheloe, Steinberg, & Gresson, 1996), this emphasis 
is unsurprising. However, the return of those debates also suggests that 
psychologists, and their historians, have not figured out how to get beyond 
the forms of power at play in IQ research, and that there is an urgent need to 
think outside the contours of nature/nurture debates carved out by Terman 
and his contemporaries. In recent years Terman’s sexology has been 
examined in the context of lesbian, gay, and queer history (Hegarty, 2003; 
Minton, 1997, 2003; Terry, 1999), and in histories of sex surveys (Ericksen, 
1999) and eugenics (Kline, 2002; Stern, 2005). Yet relationships between 
Terman’s sexology and his IQ work have largely been left understudied. This 
article explores the possibility that overlooked relationships between 
“intelligence” and both “masculinity–femininity” and the homo/heterosexual 
binaries in Terman’s work provide a new vantage point on the inertia of 
debates about intelligence. 
 
The Power of the Norm 
 
It is becoming increasingly obvious that it is impossible to analyze the 
history of “scientific racism” and psychology’s sexual politics as if they 
were separate from each other. American eugenicists, including Terman, 
were popular intellectuals because their political visions offered solutions to 
several intersecting anxieties about race, family, and gender (Kline, 2001), 
the ontologization of the homosexual body was informed by scientific 
racism (Sommerville, 1994), dis- courses of homosexuality have had very 
uneven effects along class and race lines in the United States (e.g., 
Chauncey, 1994; Terry, 1999), and African Americans have often been 
stigmatized in social science literatures for perceived deviations from 
White’s norms for heterosexual kinship (Cohen, 1997). In the conclusion of 
his study of Romantic genius, Elfenbein (1998, pp. 210 –214) briefly 
suggested that Terman’s work on gifted children is not only about race, but 
also haunted by19th century associations between queerness and genius. 
Following Elfenbein (1998), I will describe Terman’s work on gifted 
children as an underacknowledged part of Foucault’s (1978) scientia 
sexualis, not only because it is one more site where the sexualities of 
individuals are scrutinized, measured, and disciplined, but also because it is 
a point where the raw material of many adult scientia - the intelligent man 
of reason - becomes increasingly defined by heritable high intelligence 
produced through heterosexual reproduction. 
 
Foucault (1978) described sexuality as the privileged site of selfhood in 
modernity because it allows for the articulation of many relationships 
between the body and the soul, the individual and the population, and the 
normal and the pathological. For Foucault (1978, 2003a), the secular 
normalizing sciences that focused on sexuality in the late 19th century 
operated through differential attention toward abnormal bodies and practices 
and a relative silence around the bodies and practices of reproductive 
married heterosexual couples. This understanding of the operations of 
normalizing power follows Foucault’s earlier notion of individ- ualizing 
power, which works through the inscription of the psychology of the 
powerless practiced by “[a]ll the sciences, analyses of practices employing 
the root ‘psycho-’” (Foucault, 1977; p. 193). Thus, for Foucault, to be 
surveilled by psychology is to be in the grips of modern power. 
 
Useful as Foucaultian studies of modern “sexualities” have been, Terman’s 
work on the inheritance of high IQ requires clarification of this now 
paradigmatic approach to psychological power.  The modern human 
sciences developed two distinct forms of normalization. Historians of 19th 
century statistics (e.g., Gigerenzer, Swijtink, Porter, & Daston, 1989; 
Hacking, 1990) have distinguished Durkheim’s socially conservative 
understanding of the average as the ideal - flanked by symmetrical 
pathological deviations - from Galton’s socially progressive notion of 
people of unusual intelligence as cherished exceptions that might drag  
society  forward  from  its  currently  mediocre  state  (e.g.,  Galton,  1869). 
Indeed, there is some evidence that Foucault understood this distinction. He 
recognized that eugenics operated according to a different logic than the 
scientia sexualis; it appealed to an older logic of inherited bloodlines rather 
than the superior health of the individual body. Unlike the disciplinary 
power that worked by making people visible, eugenics was understood by 
Foucault as a form of the older “sovereign power,” which made the 
powerful visible as objects of veneration (Foucault, 1978, pp. 147–150; see 
also Foucault, 2003b). Indeed, within the Galtonian eugenic framework, 
psychologists often venerate their predecessors. Terman wrote an article 
claiming that Galton’s childhood Stanford-Binet score would have been 200 
had it been measured (Terman, 1917), dedicated his series Genetic Studies 
of Genius (hereafter GSG) on his gifted cohort to Galton in its opening 
volume (Terman, 1925), and published the doctoral research of his student 
Catharine Cox on the childhood IQs of historical figures as its 
second(Cox, 1926). To this day, Galton often shows up simultaneously as 
both founding theorist and exemplar of the theory in psychologists’ 
accounts of the inheritance of genius (e.g., Simonton, 2004). 
 
However, the location of highly intelligent people within a socially 
progressive discourse of Galtonian normativity was far from uncontested in 
the late 19th century. Rather, as Becker (1978) describes it, psychologists 
such as Galton and Terman were engaged in a century-long “mad genius 
controversy,” opposing the work of psychiatrists such as Moreau de Tours 
(1859), Lombroso (1889), and Nordeau (1905) who conflated artistic 
genius with disequilibrium, degeneracy, and a host of other forms of 
pathological nonnormativity. Huertas (1993) describes the pathologizing of 
artistic genius in 19th century psychiatry as a reaction that discredited the 
work of authors who critiqued the bourgeois order. Thus, “Zola’s novels do 
not prove that things are badly managed in this world, but merely that 
Zola’s nervous system is out of order” (Nordeau, 1905, p. 499). However, 
the notion of the genius as other to the emerging bourgeois order was not 
invented whole cloth by psychiatrists. Rather, it was first cultivated by 
Romantic authors without education, wealth, or patronage, who presented 
non- normative personas to legitimate their individual rights to earn a living 
from writing. In Britain of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, “romantic 
genius” was understood to be eccentric, and individuals were accorded the 
label of “genius” to the extent that they were perceived to transgress norms 
of civil humanism that proscribed moderation and self-regulation for male 
citizens (Elfenbein, 1998). Thus, like the eugenics that followed it, the 
romantic notion of genius was forward looking and valued the genius for 
his or her exceptionality. 
 
This form of genius was paradigmatically male, but relied heavily on the 
performance of androgyny (Battersby, 1989), and androgyny raised frequent 
suspicions that a male genius might practice sodomy, or that a female genius 
might be Sapphic (Elfenbein, 1998). Elfenbein (1998) argues that this 
construction shaped ‘the invention of the homosexual,” which Foucault 
(1978) locates in the last third of the 19th century. Indeed, Nordau’s (1905, 
p. vii) classic text on degeneracy opens with the observation that 
degenerates were not always criminals, prostitutes, anarchists, or lunatics; 
“they are often authors and artists.” Genius individuals were said to show 
both impaired control over free thought, and “ego-mania,” which lead to a 
desire for strong sensations and a love of the strange, the bizarre, and the 
perverse. Oscar Wilde was exemplary of such patterns (Nordau, 1905; pp. 
320 –322). Association with genius was also commonly used to normalize 
homosexuality. Havelock Ellis (1904) made 
no mention of this association in his volume on genius (which included 
male and female genius in a ratio of 18:1), but his subsequent volume on 
sexual inversion noted that many sexologists had already drawn links 
between sexual inversion and genius (Ellis, 1936). Freud (1953/1910) also 
allowed that the genius could result from the “sublimation” of excessive 
libido into creative works, and would later refer to Ellis’ work when 
appeasing one 20th century American mother’s anxiety about her son’s 
homosexuality (Abelove, 1993). 
 
Thus, the “mad genius controversy” was characterized by a shared 
assumption that genius was rare and typically male, but varied in the 
description of exceptional persons beyond societal norms. Were they akin to 
madmen, or were they naturally disposed to rule more ordinary men? 
Women were less often positioned as exemplars of the category of genius, 
but were more often positioned as vectors of its heterosexual reproduction 
and maternal nurturance, a discourse that is echoed in more recent 
dismissals of feminist work on genius (Battersby, 1989). For example, 
Galton (1869) bemoaned the squandering of hereditary genius by male peers 
who married rich women rather than women from eminent families. Royse 
(1891, p. 18) went further with his androcentrism, describing mothers as 
irrelevant to the inheritance of genius; women were the “conservative factor 
in reproduction” such that “all new variations as caused by the influence of 
the male” (p. 19). 
 
Terman was fully cognizant of these Victorian literatures. In the second 
publication of his long career, Terman (1905) described natural and 
environmentally induced variations in the development of individuals and 
racial groups, as “precocity” and “prematuration,” respectively, and morally 
privileged the former over the latter. Echoing colonial arguments, such as 
Galton’s, that some racial groups were not fit for democracy, Terman 
(1905, p. 147) included among prematuration’s ill effects “the engrafting of 
mature civilization on to primitive races” (see also Pols, 2007). Among 
individuals in the United States, the acquisition of criminality, neurasthenia, 
and religious dogmatism were all attributed to prematuration. Voicing 
caution about modernization, Terman noted how such risks were heightened 
by the accelerated pace of modern life. 
 
Terman (1905) drew extensively on the literature linking genius with 
degeneracy,  and  indirectly  associated  genius  with  sexual  inversion  to  
do  so.  He followed Lombroso in theorizing degeneracy and genius as 
commonly caused by excessive organic activity and nervous instability, and 
described genius children as particularly vulnerable to the effects of the 
prematuration that characterized modernity. For Terman (1905, p. 173), 
sexual development was a particular concern; “no other phase of precocity 
is so important as that related to the premature development of the sexual 
functions, and no other is so difficult to treat.” Again, Terman argued that 
modern life might bring on such precocity and pointed to the increasing 
rates of sexual inversion to underscore his point. Thus, from his earliest 
work, Terman was concerned with sexual inversion as a consequence of 
modernization, to which gifted children were likely to succumb, leading 
them to fail to develop as vigorous heterosexuals. 
 
Terman wrote this paper while a doctoral-level student at Clarke and while 
under the influence of G. Stanley Hall, who defined “adolescence” in that 
same year as that precarious phase of life that occurred after sexual desires 
had emerged—at least for males—and before willpower and self-control 
were firmly in place (Hall, 1904). As Moran (2000, p. 15) notes, Hall’s 
theory made chastity and self-denial central to adolescents’ task of 
completing the recapitulation of the species history and affording the 
transition to civilized adult leadership; “[a]dolescence was precisely that 
period of chastity between puberty, or sexual awakening, and marriage, 
when the young man or woman’s sexual impulses could finally be 
expressed.” For Hall, the adolescent’s dilemma of restraining sexual 
impulses until marriage was quintessentially male. Adolescent girls did not 
experience such strong sexual desires; both passions and the rationality 
required to master them were androcentric categories (see Shields, 2007, 
this volume). 
 
Like many of Hall’s students, Terman went on to write extensively on the 
topic of social hygiene when he left Clark, but his most celebrated early 
triumph was the Stanford-Binet, which made intelligence a measurable 
property of all American children (Terman, 1916). Throughout this early 
work on intelligence, Terman torqued the concept such that it did more than 
identify low-ability children, as Binet’s test had done. In the army work, 
Terman’s contribution included a focus on the use of the test not only to 
detect dull soldiers who were unsuited to military work, but also soldiers of 
higher ability who might be promoted into leadership positions (Carson, 
1993, p. 295). In 1919, at Terman’s request, Stanford established a research 
fellowship for the study of gifted children. The first recipient, Jessie Fenton, 
was charged with following up 31 children of high IQ that Terman had 
identified by that point in time (Minton, 1988, p. 111). In Terman’s work, 
IQ was not only the grounds for explaining why some seemingly normal 
students failed at school (see Danziger, 1997, pp. 74 –78), but also a means 
of selecting naturally gifted students for selective educational advantages. 
The bell of the IQ curve foretold the fortunes of both those destined for 
greatness and leadership, as well as those condemned by nature to 
intellectual failure. 
 
The Genders of Gifted Children 
 
Given this emphasis on high achieving children, it is not surprising that the 
opening pages of Genetic Studies of Genius 1 (GSG1) includes a repudiation 
of Terman’s (1905) earlier views on the evils of prematuration. Rather than 
being the victims of modernization, undiscovered gifted children were to be 
rescued from lives of mediocre education by the modern science of IQ 
testing, and to progressively move society forward through the nurture of 
their superior inherited talents. In modernist fashion, Terman described the 
psychology of genius as having a long past and a short history. Genius had 
been studied by the ancient Greeks, but its scientific study awaited the 
undoing of such false beliefs as the idea that “the Great Man” is 
qualitatively different from others, that “intellectual precocity is 
pathological,” and democratic sentiments that encouraged “an attitude 
unfavorable to a just appreciation of native individual differences in human 
endowment.” The science of genius had to wait particularly for “the tardy 
birth of the biological sciences, particularly genetics, psychology, and 
education” (Terman, 1925, v). 
 
Given the almost equal number of boys and girls in the cohort, and the ways 
that the methods of recruitment lead to the overrepresentation of White, 
middle- class, and urban children (Terman, 1925, pp. 19 –55), this project 
has been more often critiqued as racist rather than sexist or homophobic 
(see, for example, Cravens, 1992). However, gender was “in the making” 
in this work (Haraway, 1997), particularly because the labor of the project 
was structured along gender lines, and because the “intelligence” of the 
gifted children was explained in ways that were utterly consistent with 19th 
century androcentric thought. In 1921, Jessie Fenton organized the 6-week 
long fieldwork training of Florence Goodenough, Helen Marshall, 
Florence Fuller, and Dorothy Yates, who were to find gifted children in 
California’s cities’ schools. Teachers were asked to propose their brightest 
and youngest students, who were given a pencil and paper IQ test. Initially, 
Terman had planned to select the top 5% of this group for Stanford-Binet 
testing. However, extracting giftedness from classrooms was harder than 
Terman anticipated; 10% of the older children and 15% of the younger 
children were selected for Stanford-Binet testing. The 307 girls and 354 
boys who scored above 140 on the Stanford-Binet were included in the 
gifted cohort. While women materialized these children as “gifted,” the 
slight preponderance of boys in the sample was attributed to masculinizing 
influence, specifically the “vigor or vitality of parents [which] favors 
maleness of offspring” while also “exert(ing) a favorable influence upon the 
nervous structure and metal development of the offspring” (GSG1, pp. 50 -
53). 
 
This privileging of natural masculine influences over women’s labor was 
at odds with the many ways that the field assistants developed “situated 
knowledges” (Haraway, 1991) in the field that presaged later critiques of 
IQ research, including those of Black scholars most vulnerable to the tests’ 
individualizing effects (Thomas, 1984/1995). Helen Marshall (1921) 
reported to Terman on the social effects of his arbitrary definitions of genius 
as an IQ of 140 and convinced him to select one girl who fell below this 
threshold. Dorothy Yates (1922) critiqued the invasive questions she was 
demanded to ask of parents’ while securing their cooperation and 
participation in the study. However, Terman understood the fieldworkers’ 
abilities as defined less by their intelligence than by their personality. When 
M. E. Haggerty (1921) wrote to recommend Florence Fuller for her 
position, he noted her high scores on several intelligence tests. Terman’s 
(1921) reply to Haggerty was disinterested in these and specified a 
different type of information; “I think you understand the type of person I 
will have to have. Personality is extremely important. A field worker must 
meet with all kinds of people, get on with teachers and be able to run down 
information. Absolute dependability is of course a primary essential.” 
Terman was aware that a gifted cohort only came into being through 
women’s labor, but in his practice and theory it was their male patriarchs 
that gave them their intelligence and vigor. Women served only as the 
media through which gifted children came into his world. 
 
In response to 19th century theories that had questioned the sanity of the 
genius, the gifted children’s bodies and minds were extensively scrutinized 
to purify them of any abnormality. Psychologist Bird Baldwin conducted a 
range of anthropometric measures, and Terman happily reported that gifted 
children had heavier birth weights and reached puberty earlier—as assessed 
by menstruation among the girls and the first appearance of a kink in the 
pubic hair of the boys (Terman, 1925, pp. 173–214). Gifted children were 
precocious not only in their intellectual but also in their physical 
development, confirming the idea that precocious intelligence involves 
heritable vigor and vitality, and reflects natural variation among age-mates. 
 
Given the long-standing association between genius and androgyny, and the 
association of health with masculinity in Terman’s text, it is not surprising 
that the children’s masculinities were also measured. But unlike age or 
weight, no metric existed which could be considered a yardstick of 
masculinity. However, as with IQ, Terman knew that such metrics could be 
materialized in the absence of meaningful zero points by comparing people 
against each other to create statistically normal and abnormal cases. The 
children’s preferred games and activities were given a “masculinity index” 
based on the proportion of boys and girls - in both the gifted and nongifted 
groups - liked each activity. Each child was then given a “masculinity” 
score based on the average masculinity of his or her preferred games and 
activities. In other words, and in accordance with poststructuralist theories 
of gender (e.g., Butler, 1990), Terman’s “masculinity” was a norm, defined 
in entirely relative terms, unsupported by either coherent theory or external 
behavioral referent. Half a century later, tests of gender developed along 
these lines were deemed by Constantinople (1973) to have utterly failed as 
means of predicting anything about individual behavior at all. 
 
As both feminists and psychoanalysts might expect, Terman’s construction 
of gender encoded masculinity as presence and femininity as its absence. 
The masculinity of the activities ranged from + 24 (“playing with 
tools”) to + 2 (“playing with dolls”). Gifted boys, but not girls, were 
slightly more masculine than the control subjects (Terman et al., 1925, p. 
437). When Terman (1925) found the play preferences of gifted and 
nongifted boys to be similar, he concluded, “these correlations offer no 
support to the popular belief that the gifted boy is effeminate in his play 
interests.” Notably, no such parallel conclusion about the gender of gifted 
girls’ interests was made. However, the ghost of the effeminate genius was 
not entirely dispelled by Terman’s tests and measures. A histogram of the 
masculinity scores of all of the gifted and control subjects clearly shows a 
nine year old gifted boy who scored much lower on “masculinity” than any 
of the other boys (Terman, 1921, p. 411). Gifted boys were purified of 
effeminacy when viewed in the aggregate, but not when gifted children 
were individually visible. 
 
Terman’s interest in the gifted children’s genders grew with the cohort. 
In1927, he recruited former student Catharine Cox back to Stanford to 
collaborate on the development of the “Masculinity-Femininity” test,1  which 
was used again in the follow-up study reported in GSG3. The test was now 
labeled “masculinity– femininity,” consisted of seven separate subtests, and 
was scored on a 200-point scale from -100 (feminine) to + 100 
(masculine). The gifted and control groups were again more similar than 
different. However, a histogram of the scores for 75 gifted boys and 72 gifted 
girls again showed a gifted boy who scored considerably more feminine than 
all the others (Terman et al., 1930, p. 156). In addition, GSG3 broached the 
topic of the less gender-conforming gifted children’s possible sexual 
inversion explicitly. GSG3 contained case histories of two such children: 
Renwick and Roberta. 
 
Attention to gender nonconformity among gifted children did not lead 
Terman et al. (1930) to automatic homophobic inferences in GSG3. Gibson 
(1998) argues that gender inversion theories of homosexuality during this 
period were easier to render complicit with heteronormativity when they 
focused on the devalued effeminacy of gay men, than the valued masculinity 
of lesbians. Terman et al. (1930, p. 328) admitted that “invert tendencies are 
no more common among men of genius but may be so among intellectually 
gifted women” (p. 328). However, this construction of inversion and female 
intelligence was part of a broader association of giftedness with masculinity 
in children of all genders. Terman also remained far more interested in the 
future achievements of gifted boys than gifted girls. Renwick was a talented 
musician whose parents installed a pipe organ in their home for him at the 
age of 11. Roberta had exceptional mechanical abilities, but Terman did not 
report how her parents nurtured her talents, or whether they thought it 
important to do so at all. Terman cites “the forecast of professional critics” 
that Renwick will have a “brilliant future in music” (p. 329), but Roberta’s 
future career possibilities were not discussed. Rather, her interests in 
masculine play and games are “perhaps even more interesting than the 
actual nature of her mechanical output.” In the era of second-wave 
feminism, when androgyny came to be seen once again as ideal rather than 
pathological (Hegarty, 2003), Sears and Barbee (1977) could analyze 
Terman’s data on gifted women and note the conflicts they experienced 
between their talents and social restrictive roles. This would not be the last 
time that Terman overlooked this conflict, or that intelligence would be 
defined in ways that excluded women’s capacity to embody knowledge. 
 
From Gendered Intelligence to Inverted Genius 
 
Tentatively purified of effeminacy by the measurement of their 
masculinity, intellectually gifted boys seemed to be statistically abnormal 
but well adjusted. The talents of gifted masculine girls described in GSG3 
further suggested that intelligence was a masculine province. The next 
volume on the gifted cohort was 17 years away. In the interim, Terman and 
Catharine Cox Miles developed a measure of gender, with seven subtests, 
recalibrated to range from -200 (extremely feminine) to + 200 (extremely 
masculine), that could be applied to all (Terman & Miles, 1936). This test, 
and the 1936 book Sex and Personality that described it, were funded by the 
National Research Council’s Committee for Research on Problems of Sex 
(CRPS), chaired by Robert Yerkes. At this time, this committee  was  
reticent  to  fund  research  on  human  sexual  behavior  (Clarke, 1998). 
However, as Terry (1999) notes, Terman was one of a few scientists whose 
successes in fields other than sexology allowed them to secure funding 
from the CRPS for human behavioral studies, in part because his success in 
the IQ field had made him appear trustworthy to the committee. However, 
Terman and Miles’ work was materially tied to Terman’s work on 
intelligence in other ways too. 
 
Sex and Personality has received some scrutiny in recent decades. First, 
feminists criticized the test’s arbitrary items, its assumption that masculinity 
and femininity are logical opposites, its failure to predict gendered 
behaviors, and its conflation of MF with hetero/homosexual identity among 
men (see, for example, Constantinople, 1973; Lewin, 1984a, 1984b). 
Consistent with Butler’s (1990, 1993) claims that categories of normative 
gender coalesce through the repeated abjection of queerness, historians of 
sexuality have more recently emphasized how “masculinity” and 
“femininity” result from Terman and Miles’ (1936) efforts to detect and 
normalize people with “abnormal” genders in this work (Hegarty, 2003; 
Terry, 1999). 
 
These successive waves of criticisms raise the question of whether Sex and 
Personality was a study of inter- or intragender differences. This question 
cannot be easily resolved in simple either-or terms. To get his work done, 
Terman strategically presented the test as having different goals to different 
audiences. To secure approval to run the studies at Stanford, Terman (1926) 
described it as “simply an investigation of sex differences in nonintellectual 
traits.” But penal institutions were also keen to collaborate on the 
development of a test that could discern male homosexuals from other kinds 
of men. In 1928, Terman wrote to several California  Prisons  to  secure  
access  to  homosexual  inmates  (Terman, 1928a, 1928b, 1928c), and E. 
Lowell Kelly began by studying inmates in the San Quentin State Prison. 
When Terman (1928d) wrote to Jessie Fenton’s husband Norman, who 
worked in California’s juvenile correctional system, to secure further 
“homosexuals, inverts, and so forth,” he confidently informed him “our 
San Quentin homos have yielded some exceedingly interesting data. All of 
them tested in the last decile of men for masculinity.” Norman Fenton 
encouraged Terman to explore the MF scores of “definitely defined 
homosexuals who have also taken definitely defined masculine and 
feminine parts in the process.” In Sex and Personality, this putative 
distinction between “masculine” and “feminine” parts in men’s homosexual 
practices sex rescued the study’s assumption that homosexuality was a form 
of gender inversion. Men interned in San Quentin scored as feminine on the 
MF test, but 56 army prisoners in Alcatraz, serving sentences for sodomy, 
scored on average +66.2, almost identical to the mean for male college 
students. Terman and Miles (1936) determined that only the former group 
were “true” inverts; the latter were more likely to be bisexual - much as the 
Ancient Greeks had been (Terman & Miles, 1936, p. 256; see Hegarty, 
2003; Terry, 1999 for discussion). 
 
In making sense of the work reported in Sex and Personality, it is useful to 
remember not only Foucault’s (1978) claim that power comes “from below” 
where the interpolation of homosexuality is in question, but also Terry’s 
(1999, p. 18) description of modern researchers’ collaborations with their 
homosexual participants as “episodic rather than constant, . . . seldom 
harmonious, and . . . nearly always nonegalitarian.” Terman was 
occasionally asked by men for expert advice about their homosexuality, 
including at least one psychiatrist who had gathered test scores from 
homosexual patients (Kline, 2002, p. 136). However, the MF test was 
particularly attractive within penal contexts because of its potential to 
materialize psychological properties of individuals without their knowledge 
or consent. Terman and Miles’ (1936, pp. 77–79) studies had shown that 
female and male undergraduates could fake their MF scores if they wanted 
to. Thus, keeping participants ignorant of the test’s purpose was essential to 
its functioning. Terman’s letters, which introduced Kelly to prison wardens, 
described how “those tested would not know the purpose of the test” 
(Terman, 1928a, b, c). Later, while employed at the State Bureau of Juvenile 
Research, Fenton sent Terman case histories and the MF scores of several 
boys who were being corrected for their homosexuality and effeminate 
interests. In one case, Fenton (1932) described the MF test as giving the 
psychologist “an entering wedge in telling the boy to face reality in regard 
to his interests,” which had focused on art and literature. In a classic 
Foucaultian formation, artistic inclinations were interpreted as effeminate 
and transgressive, male subjects were incited to put their sexuality into 
discourse, and the desired consequence was a normalization that eradicated 
that homosexuality for the subject’s own good. 
 The development of the MF test as a means of defining “sexual 
inversion” was unintentionally androcentric. Terman endeavored, but failed, 
to find a sample of female “inverts.” Katherine Davis, of the American 
Social Hygiene Association, whose own survey was one of the first to ask 
women explicit questions about homosexual practices (Davis, 1929), 
advised Terman to look for lesbians among social workers (Zinn, 1928). 
Another colleague advised a look to women’s colleges, and  to  England,  
where  women  greatly  outnumbered  men  (Bridges, 1929). Gibson (1998) 
notes that scientists often protected heteronormativity from the threat of the 
intelligent masculine lesbian during this period by equating lesbians’ 
masculinity with that of non-White men who were thought to evidence 
evolutionary retardation (see Carter, 1997; Sommerville, 1991). The 
information that Terman received about lesbians was similarly racialized. In 
one letter, Norman Fenton (1928) described to Terman how Black girls take 
“the masculine role” with White girls in mixed institutions. Ultimately, 
Terman found no institutions to collaborate with in studying female 
inversion, but Sex and Personality included a study of “delinquent girls” 
instead. Once again an association between intelligence and masculinity 
among women was produced. The girls who scored masculine not only had 
higher IQ scores, but their true IQ scores were estimated by Terman and 
Miles (1936, pp. 321–341) to be several points higher than the test scores 
that were actually observed. However, if Terman considered masculine 
women to be intelligent, his own network seemed devoid of the intelligence 
necessary to materialize a sufficient sample of “female sexual inverts” to 
properly test his theory. 
 
The conflation of high IQ and masculinity at play in the gifted study 
constructed effeminacy among males as problematic. Terman and Miles 
(1936) explicitly described their work as oriented toward normalizing 
children whose genders were atypical, and they deployed a child with 
atypical intelligence to introduce this goal. An assistant had found the 
masculinity scores of one of the gifted boys, identified only as “X,” to be so 
feminine that it suggested that he was a girl who had been classified 
incorrectly; “[t]he scores was accordingly checked for error . . . but no error 
was found” (p. 14). This child was most likely the visible outlier on the 
histograms in GSG1 and GSG3.2  At the time of the second study: 
 
One of his favorite amusements was to dress himself as a stylish young woman, 
apply cosmetics liberally, and walk down the street to see how many men he could 
lure into flirtation. 
 
X is partially excused, and Terman and Miles (1936) project further 
warranted, by a description of X as working toward self-rehabilitation: 
 
X is an example of the highest type of mental sexual inversion; he has high 
principles, is passionately devoted to his work, and seems to have rejected all overt 
expression of his homosexual inclinations (p. 15). 
 Later, in a discussion of their data on “passive male homosexuals,” Terman 
and Miles (1936, p. 264) describe the MF scale as useful apropos of boys 
who develop differently, because “preventative measures might be found 
that would direct their sexual development into normal channels.” 
 
This abnormalizing description is worth pausing over for several reasons. 
While Cravens (1992) argues that there is little historical merit in judging 
Terman by contemporary political standards, I’ll wager a few lines here that 
there are lessons for the present to be learned from closely examining different 
forms of normativity at play in Terman’s work, analyzing the range of 
narratives of research subjects’ lives that they configure, and critiquing the 
range of human practices that fall within or beyond the category of 
“intelligence” for Terman, and his many followers. The description of X 
marks a divergence between the use of Galtonian norms (generally applied to 
gifted children throughout Terman’s work) and of Durkheimian norms 
(applied to sexual inversion throughout Sex and Personality). Whether or not 
X and “Renwick” in GSG3 are the same person or not, there is a world of 
difference between the narrative of an effeminate boy en route to adult genius 
and of one in danger of falling to sexual inversion. X’s life is a tragedy that 
warrants intervention, which he himself has some capacity to assist. Renwick’s 
narrative of inherited genius unfolds naturally through maturation with 
occasional epiphenomenal eccentricities. Intervening in the lives of people 
such as X requires that inversion be a learned unnatural mutable condition. In 
spite of the claims of almost all of the men that were inter- viewed as “case 
histories,” Terman and Miles (1936) repeatedly describe sexual inversion as 
both acquired and changeable. By 1936 Terman has moved far from the 
19th century theories associating sexual inversion with genius, or the gifted 
child with a tendency to wilt into sexual deviance under the pressures of 
modernity. Now, the gifted child’s superior intelligence is a resource that 
makes him a higher form of “sexual inverts,” one that we might even hope 
will rehabilitate himself into normal heterosexuality. 
 
The possibility that heterosexual normalcy might be what precocious 
intelligence seeks obscures the possibility that X’s nonnormative enactments 
of gender and sexuality are manifestations of genius. Yet, it is no small task 
for a 15-year-old boy to dress as a woman and to lure sailors into flirtation. 
This must be particularly so when “it is practically certain that at this time X 
had no knowledge whatsoever of the existence of such a thing as 
homosexuality” (Terman & Miles, 1936, p. 15). There is nothing strange about 
the equation of the embodiment of femininity with intelligence among Western 
male intellectuals. For example, Havelock Ellis offers the patronizing argument 
that men’s greater capacity for artistic genius was a compensation for their 
inability to give birth (Ellis, 1934). Fourteen years later, Alan Turing would 
initiate the discussion of artificial intelligence by positioning the behavior of a 
man passing as a woman as the paradigmatic behavior that a computer must 
emulate to be deemed intelligent (Turing, 1950; see also Curtain, 1997). I 
do not want to conflate X’s enactment of gender with “performance” in 
Turing’s (1950) sense of disembodied intentional deception. We do not know, 
and cannot know, from the spectacularization of X’s gender in Sex and 
Personality, much of how X enacted, embodied, or understood that 
performance. As transgender scholars have argued, it is wrong to assume that 
X was not identified incorrectly as male, but at birth, rather than when he 
entered the gifted cohort (e.g., Prosser, 1998). Yet, the resistance of X’s 
performance of gender to interpretation as a form of intelligent activity not only 
shows the separate ontologies of normativity that have developed around 
sexuality and intelligence, but also the degree to which sexual and gender 
transgression have become signs of social disorder that are obscure to the 
masculinist definition of intelligence emergent in Terman’s work. 
 
Just a few months before Sex and Personality was published, one of the 
gifted children from Terman’s earlier study was incarcerated as a sex 
criminal in San Quentin, the prison from which the “passive male 
homosexuals” for Sex and Personality were drawn. Composer Henry 
Cowell was arrested for engaging in a sexual act with a 17-year-old boy, 
one of several who frequented the swimming pool at his Menlo Park 
home, a few miles from the Stanford campus (Hicks,1991). Cowell was 
not just one-among-many gifted children; he had authored a paper on his 
genius for musical composition in the American Journal of Psychology that 
Terman had introduced (Cowell, 1926). In Shurkin’s opinion (1992) Cowell 
was the only gifted child that Terman studied who ever “made a name in 
music or in art.” Cowell’s trial was spectacularized in San Francisco papers, 
exemplifying the growing panic about sex crimes that Freedman (1987) 
describes as typical of the late 1930s. In an appeal for Cowell’s release, 
Terman contributed a statement on the grounds that he was not a “true 
homosexual” but merely had delayed heterosexual adjustment because of 
the strong influence of his mother (Hicks, 1991, p. 105). Once again, a 
higher form of sexual invert was repudiatiable, but in this case a feminist 
mother, rather than femininity per se, was described as being the cause of 
the inversion. Terman’s letter was unsuccessful in convincing the California 
Board of Prison Terms to review Cowell’s 15-year sentence. However, the 
election of democrat Cuthbert Olson as Governor of California in 1938 
initiated a period of prison reform and the commuting of sentences of 
several convicted “sex offenders.” Cowell was released on parole in 1940 
(Hicks, 1991). 
 
Marital Happiness 
 
Thus, throughout Terman’s work, masculinity is conflated with vigor and 
intelligence, and masculinity and femininity are logical opposites (see 
Constantinople,1973), such that the possibility of intelligence being feminine 
becomes increasingly unviable. When gifted men and boys queer the pitch of 
this logic, they may be rehabilitated as heterosexuals in the making, if they 
actively undo influences coded as feminine. In Terman’s work on marital 
happiness (Terman et al., 1938), which overlapped with the writing of the Sex 
and Personality volume, this logic reoccurs. As in the gifted study, in 
Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness women become unsuited to 
intelligent creative work, and heterosexual male sexual practices become 
invisible to the kinds of normativizing schemes linking gender and sexual 
practice used to spectacularize the “passive male homosexuals” in Sex and 
Personality. 
 
By the 1930s, Victorian marital norms had utterly broken down as a result 
of a variety of factors; pre- and post-World War I women’s demands for 
sexual freedom, the failures of sex education to inculcate in men the control 
of sexual desires through reason and fear, women’s increasing political and 
workplace participation, continuing urbanization, and immigration and 
migration being among the most frequently discussed (see Cott, 2000; 
D’Emilio & Freedman, 1988; Moran, 2000; Neuhaus, 2000; Terry, 1999). 
Marital advice in the 1920s moved away from unequal Victorian roles based 
on gendered natures, toward the notion of companionate marriage based on 
mutual friendship and satisfaction between spouses. This literature, along 
with an increasing number of sex surveys (e.g., Davis, 1929; Hamilton, 
1929) stressed that sexual satisfaction was important for marital happiness. 
Indeed, published marital advice increasingly blamed unskilled husbands for 
their wives lack of orgasms, and consequently for any lack of marital 
satisfaction (Neuhaus, 2000). In other words, men’s heterosexual practices 
were becoming objects of knowledge that were critical to understand if 
marriage was to remain stable, and women were positioned as the ones with 
the uniquely embodied expertise to determine their husband’s measure in 
this regard. 
 
In 1930, E. Lowell Kelly introduced to Terman the new literature on marital 
happiness. Kelly believed, along with an increasing number of 
psychologists, that personality might play an underrecognized role in 
marital happiness (Moran, 2000). He also held that women’s orgasms were 
not so important after all. Terman dissuaded Kelly from conducting 
longitudinal research on marital happiness for his PhD (Minton, 1988, pp. 
178 –179). Upon completing an experimental PhD in 1931, Kelley moved 
to the University of Hawaii. Terman secured funding from the National 
Research Council’s Committee for Research on Problems of Sex, headed by 
Robert Yerkes, for himself and Kelly to conduct both a cross-sectional and a 
longitudinal study of marital happiness. Terman hoped to fund Kelly’s 
postdoctoral research at Stanford with this money, but Kelly was hired to 
the University of Connecticut, and began his project there by recruiting 100 
engaged couples from newspaper announcements.3 Thus, Terman was left 
with a somewhat unwanted research project on the psychology  of  
marriage.4   Left  without  Kelly’s  assistance,  Terman  contacted the 
American Institute for Family Relations, which was founded and headed by 
the eugenicist and marriage counseling advocate Paul Popenoe, who ex- 
pounded the prevailing view that wives’ orgasms and husbands’ skills were 
the key to a happy marriage (Neuhaus, 2000, pp. 457– 459).5    
 
Terman initially wanted 1,000 couples in the study, and particularly wanted 
Wilson to sample unhappy couples. However, as with his gifted cohort, 
situated knowledges a propos of data collection frustrated this desire for 
clean round numbers. Couples were to complete the survey simultaneously, 
but independently, to satisfy Terman’s demands for both anonymity and a 
complete data set. This made Wilson’s job particularly taxing. In addition to 
the Institute’s clients, Wilson worked with a wide range of groups—the 
California Eugenic Society, Los Angeles Churches, and labor unions among 
them—to construct the ultimate sample of 792 couples (Terman, 1934; 
Wilson, 1935a, 1935b). 
 
Like “Masculinity-Femininity,” and “intelligence,” “marital happiness” was 
a psychological entity measured by multiple scales, averaged to form a 
single index, and it became a measurable psychological property of 
individuals only by com- paring people against each other. Key items 
referred to husbands’ and wives’ subjective martial satisfaction, methods of 
settling disagreements, and frequency of complaints with each other. 
Terman pulled out the data on the happiest and the least happy couples in an 
attempt to determine the basis of marital happiness. As Minton (1988, p. 
182) notes, Terman’s conclusions were consistent with earlier views; 
conservative women were happier than feminists, and although education 
did not predict wives’ happiness, women who strived for professions in 
literature, music, and journalism were more likely to be unhappy. Happy 
women were instead involved in “such an exacting occupation as that of the 
laboratory technician” (p. 151), much as Anna had occasionally been with 
regard to Lewis’ career (Minton, 1988; p. 162). Male homosexuals may 
have been spectacularized for taking up “active” and “passive” roles by 
Terman and Miles (1936), but for married heterosexual couples, such 
nonequal role playing was a sign of adjustment and happiness. However 
much gender roles were in flux in the 1930s, and however much Terman 
had challenged 19th century pathologizing views of intellectually gifted 
people, nonegalitarian heterosexual marriage remained the normative form 
of human intimate relationship, and the maintenance of that inequality 
required that women not expect too much from the public sphere of paid 
work. 
 
Women were enjoined to lower their expectations in private arenas, as well 
as public ones, by this study. As Kelly had originally hoped, Terman et al. 
(1938) concluded that personality - rather than sexual satisfaction - was the 
key to understanding marital happiness. This conclusion was anything but 
data-driven. About one third of the women in Terman’s sample reported that 
they “never” or “sometimes” experienced orgasm during heterosex. Like 
previous authors, Terman found the frequency of wives’ orgasms to be 
substantially correlated with both partners’ marital satisfaction. Terman et 
al. (1938, pp. 304 –305) conceded that the “inadequacy of the wife” could 
be a “genuine obstacle to the achievement of a satisfactory marital 
adjustment,” but that these results “do not support the frequently expressed 
opinion that it is the one major cause of unhappiness in marriage.” Rather, 
Terman et al. (1938) expressed disdain for theories that attached importance 
to sexual satisfaction: 
 
We have no ambition to add anything to the professional sexologist’s glorification 
of sex as a psychological experience. The lily has already been sufficiently gilded.  
One even becomes a bit weary of the constantly reiterated emphasis upon sex as the 
primary basis of marital happiness, at once the soil in which it roots and the choicest 
product of its flowering. (p. 247). 
 
Terman et al. (1938) ultimately attributed “orgasm inadequacy” to wives’ 
constitutions rather than husbands’ techniques. Wives were divided into 
criterion groups according to their reported orgasm frequency, and 
correlations between personality measures and orgasm frequency were cited 
to argue that the former were the cause of the latter. Women who never or 
rarely experienced orgasm were characterized by “neurasthenic tendencies, 
diminished responsiveness, and lack of zest, vigor, or colorfulness of 
personality” suggesting “constitutional factors” (Terman et al., 1938, p. 
375). 
 
This pathologizing of women’s bodies was criticized by Harry Hollingworth 
as a conflation of correlational evidence with causal argument 
(Hollingworth, 1939, see also Kelly, 1939; Terman, 1939). This volume not 
only delegitimated married women’s judgments of their husbands’ sexual 
practices, but also relocating the cause of any effects of those husbands’ 
sexual ignorances in women’s own bodies. Terman reinscribed what Maines 
(1999) calls an androcentric model of sexuality in which heterosexual 
insertive sex that leads to men’s pleasure is erroneously thought to be the 
crux of women’s sexual satisfaction too. This norm is incompatible with the 
emerging logic that made women’s orgasmic pleasure relevant to the 
definition of heterosexual men’s functioning. Terman’s theorization of 
marital happiness closed down possibilities of locating heterosexual men’s 
sexual practices with respect to some norm for heterosex that women’s 
situated knowledge of that heterosex would adjudicate. 
 
The Sexualities of Gifted Adults 
 
When Terman returned to study the gifted cohort in adulthood, his under- 
standing of their “adjustment” was colored by his intervening studies on MF 
and on marital happiness. When the gifted were studied between 1939 and 
1941, a measure of marital happiness derived from Terman et al. (1938) 
showed them to have slightly happier marriages than the control group, just 
as a measure of gender-normativity had earlier shown them to be well-
adjusted children (Terman & Oden, 1947). However, 11 men and six 
women were “known, or believed” to have a history of homosexuality 
(Terman & Oden, 1947, p. 120). Rather than write off such persons as ill-
adjusted deviants, as Terman and Miles (1936) had done with the sex 
criminals of San Quentin, Terman and Oden (1947) cited studies by Davis 
(1929) and Kinsey (1941) to describe homosexuality as common within the 
general population, such that the gifted cohort appeared normal in the 
aggregate. They also reaffirmed earlier commitments to homosexuality as 
a changeable condition; “an overwhelming majority of persons who have 
had homosexual experiences make fairly easy transition to heterosexuality, 
but for a considerable number the transition is less easy” (Terman & 
Oden, 1947; pp. 120 –121). 
 
Like Terman’s earlier work, GSG4 also illustrates Terry’s (1999) argument 
that American psychological discourses about homosexuality had very 
different effects along class and race lines. In contrast to the deceptive 
practices engendered by the MF test in forensic contexts, Terman and 
Odens (1947, p. 70) afford the homosexual gifted adults in their study 
considerable privacy. They describe how “[t]he highly confidential nature of 
the information on homosexuality prevents the inclusion of case histories of 
the subjects involved” (Terman & Odens, 1947, p. 70). Where 
homosexuality is considered in negative terms, class lines structure lines of 
visibility; the right to maintain privacy over the details of one’s homo- 
sexual history is radically different a propos of gifted children and 
prisoners. 
 
However, with prescriptions for unequal gender roles enforced in both 
Terman’s imaginary and postwar America at large (May, 1988), it is not 
surprising that the gifted women had modest achievements. Some were 
authors, artists, missionaries, and “several of our women have taken a 
doctorate in science and have done creditable research.” However, near its 
conclusion GSG4 contains a telling comment suggesting that the purpose of 
gifted women remains Galtonian and reproductive, 78 years after 
Hereditary Genius was published: 
 
A good many of the women have made their most notable achievements in the selection of 
a mate. Two of the husbands are eminent musicians, and several others have won national 
recognition in the physical, biological, or social sciences. (p. 367) 
 
In contrast, the gifted men’s wives achievements were barely mentioned. 
These men appeared to fulfill, through their work, Terman’s political 
vision of a cognitive elite, leading the nation forward at the very moment 
that it emerged as the ruling nation of only one of two intact empires after 
World War II. In the postwar period, U.S. national security and dominance 
over the non-Soviet world would be increasingly presumed to depend on 
technological dominance. The gifted adult men whose work contributed to 
this new global formulation fulfilled Terman’s vision the most; the director 
of an atomic energy laboratory, a physiologist studying semistarvation, a 
worker in the Office of Strategic Service, an expert in enemy radar, a 
psychiatrist who studied Nazis in the Nuremberg jail, and two observers of 
the first atomic bomb tests in the Bikini islands (GSG4, pp. 364 –366). 
 
Conclusion 
 
As Terry (1999) notes, the history of sexuality is more than just a jaded 
wander through the defunct knowledge of the past. To study Terman’s 
commitments and those of the gifted children that he helped and hindered is 
to study the formation of critical components of the modern present. The 
dismantling of the New Deal as “Welfare Reform” in the 1990s 
conspicuously co-occurred with discourses of African Americans as 
embodying lower intelligence, which led to uncontrolled sexualities (e.g., 
Hernstein & Murray, 1994). American schoolchildren continue to receive 
federally funded “abstinence only” education in spite of a wealth of 
evidence that its Hallian assumptions about the promotion of teenage purity 
are tragically incorrect, counterproductive, and harmful (Irvine, 2004). Most 
recently, welfare reform has involved the promotion of marriage among 
women on welfare, guided by a correlation-causation error that such 
marriages decrease state dependency, while marriage rights are 
simultaneously “defended” by being denied to same-sex couples (Cahill, 
2005). Even in the current moment when  gay  and  lesbian  identities  are  
“affirmed” rather  than  pathologized  by psychology (see, e.g., Coyle & 
Kitzinger, 2001; Omoto & Kurzman, 2006), it remains “open season” on 
effeminate boys in ways that Terman and Miles (1936) had a hand in 
initiating (Sedgwick, 1993; see also American Psychiatric Associ- ation, 
1980; Burke, 1996; Minter, 1999). IQ is still evoked to explain social 
inequalities from which elites profit both within, and between, nations (see 
Jaccoby & Glauberman, 1995; Lynn & Vanhanen, 2002)—and to conflate 
social reputation with innate talent in interpreting the biographies of “great 
men” to support Darwinian arguments about intelligence. (Simonton, 
2004). Even in the 21st century, the view that women might be expert 
witnesses on sexuality can tellingly still present itself as “new” (Kaschal & 
Tiefer, 2002). 
 
Not only are all of those enduring forms of psychologically justified 
inequalities at stake in Terman’s work and in our own time, but they are 
variously implicated in the category of individual “intelligence,” which has 
retained its masculinist inflections despite some most dramatic expansions 
in its meaning. During the cold war, cognitive scientists paid little attention 
to the gender imitation that opens Turing’s (1950) argument about artificial 
intelligence, instantiating the question of “can a machine think?” instead 
with the zero-sum conflict game of chess - that long-standing bastion of 
inscrutable Soviet male intellectual dominance (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973; 
DeGroot, 1965; Newell & Simon, 1972). “Intelligence” has, since Terman’s 
time, become a cyborg concept that has breached the human/machine 
boundary, but continues to have investments in masculinity, heterosexuality, 
and race even in the sciences of the artificial (see, for example, Helmreich, 
1998). Terman’s work shows us that the substitution of Durkheimian norms 
for Galtonian ones is possible in psychology, and has indeed occurred a 
propos of gifted masculine boys. What would happen if that substitution 
were to continue, with wild abandon, such that the unique perspectives of 
gifted women in science, effeminate artistic boys, men who dress as women, 
poor women coping on welfare, and married women with unnameable 
problems became not only “situated knowledges,” but forms of 
“intelligence.” By reconfiguring this boundary between Durkheimian and 
Galtonian norms, modernity itself might be queered in its particulars, and 
intelligence would become transmogrified into a very different kind of 
category (Latour, 1993). Ironically, Terman’s work shows how such a 
psychology of the intellect might be achieved; by a different historically 
contingent application of normativizing logics from the one that he crafted 
and with which we currently live. Such a substitution would place the 
category of “intelligence” into the defunct toolkit of the past, and replace it 
with an as-yet unimagined logic for thinking of differences between the 
ways that people think. 
 
Notes 
 
1.   It should also be noted that the MF test also normalized racist expressions of 
“gender.” Depending on the form of the test taken, the fourth exercise “emotional 
reactions” might include questions about one’s fear of “negroes” or “foreigners” or 
the wickedness one perceives in such actions as “not going to Sunday school,” 
“being an atheist,” “being a Bolshevik,” and “not standing up when the ‘Star 
Spangled Banner’ is played” (Terman and Miles, 1936, pp. 495– 498, 519 –523). 
 
2.   That child was aged nine at the time of study that was published in GSG1, and 
in Sex and Personality X is described as being fifteen at the time of the six-year 
follow-up study reported in GSG3 (Terman & Miles, 1936, p. 14). 
 
3.   Kelly published very little on the personalities of these couples over his career 
(e.g., Kelly, 1950; Kelly & Conley, 1987), but his unpublished data was successfully 
explored by historian Elaine Tyler May (1988) as an archive of changing gender roles 
among middle-class White couples during the middle of the 20th century. 
 
4.  Terman also knew Popenoe from the Eugenic Human Betterment Foundation, 
through which he had supported Popenoe’s policy of sterilizing mentally ill and 
retarded people. 
 
5.  It is an open question as to how personally relevant the question of “marital 
happiness” was to Terman and Kelly at this time. As Shurkin (1992, pp. 83– 84) puts it 
“What made this study interesting in relation to Terman’s private life is that while he 
spent so much time investigating what made other people happy in marriage, his own 
was far from a model relationship.” During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Lewis 
Terman had a series of affairs with younger female colleagues and students (Minton, 
1988, pp. 163–166; Seagoe, 1975; 131). Both biographers describe these affairs as akin 
to open secrets; several people at Stanford appeared to know about them (including 
Anna Terman), but Lewis was reticent to discuss them. It is also unclear how these 
dynamics of marital unhappiness affected Lewis Terman’s relationship with E. Lowell 
Kelly. In November 1931, Kelly hosted Anna Terman during a visit to Hawaii 
(Kelly, 1931). His wife, Naomi, was hosted by the Terman’s at Stanford in January 
1932 (Kelly, 1932; Terman, 1932). In the summer of 1933, Kelly wrote to Terman to 
tell him about the Connecticut job, and attached a handwritten note, suggesting that 
Terman might wish to file it away from his professional papers (Kelly, 1933). He 
thanked Terman for his continued support, in spite of ‘the lamentable misunderstanding 
which arose between our families nearly two years ago.” If Terman responded with a 
personal note to Kelly’s own, he appears not to have filed it. Both a failure to respond, 
and a failure to keep a copy of any letter sent, would have been consistent with a 
general reticence to discuss his personal life, which Seagoe (1975) and Minton (1988) 
attribute to Terman. Regardless of whether the events to which Kelly dared to only 
elude involved infidelity, its suspicion, a clash of personalities, or some combination 
of the three, it would be wrong to assume that “marital happiness” was only of 
academic interest to Terman or Kelly. 
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